

TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

59-W

OFFICE OF
SECURITY AFFAIRS
Classification

Control: 13589
Rec'd: MAY 18, 1960

RM/R file
GPM/PA 12/4/70

Action
EUR

1960 MAY 19 AM 7 38

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB

9:25 PM

Info
SS
G
SP
C
L
H
INR
SB
IO

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

RECEIVED BY
() DIRECTOR () SECRETARY
() DEPUTY DIRECTOR () ASSISTANT SECRETARY

DATE 5/19/60

NO: SECTO 40, MAY 18, 9 PM

SECTION ONE OF TWO

FOI, EO OF PA AND/OR INFO

PRIORITY

TS authority to:
() CLASSIFIED () OADB
() DOWNGRADED TO () S cr () C, OADB

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 40; REPEATED INFORMATION BONN 516,
LONDON 1087, BERLIN 83, MOSCOW 218, NEW YORK 104

RM/R

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PAPER ON CONTINGENCY PLANNING PREPARED
TODAY BY TRIPARTITE WORKING GROUP REFERRED TO IN IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING TELEGRAM:

BEGIN QUOTE

FOLLOWING THE SOVIET THREATS OF NOVEMBER 1958, A TRIPARTITE
PLANNING GROUP WAS ESTABLISHED IN WASHINGTON TO COORDINATE
PLANNING BY THE THREE EMBASSIES AT BONN, GENERAL NORSTAD'S
TRIPARTITE STAFF ("LIVE OAK") AND THE HEADQUARTERS
AT BERLIN FOR THE VARIOUS CONTINGENCIES INVOLVED IN A
WITHDRAWAL BY THE SOVIET UNION FROM ITS FUNCTIONS WITH
RESPECT TO ALLIED ACCESS TO BERLIN. THE GERMANS HAVE BEEN
ACQUAINTED WITH SOME ASPECTS OF THIS PLANNING. NO PUBLIC
ATTENTION SHOULD BE DRAWN TO THE FACT THAT BERLIN CONTINGENCY
PLANNING IS NOW UNDER DISCUSSION, BUT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS
WISH TO PRESENT A SUMMARY OF THE STATUS OF PLANNING TO THE
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IN ORDER THAT THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT:

CONFIRM THE AGREEMENTS WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE
ON SOME MEASURES,

(2) BE MADE AWARE OF CERTAIN DECISIONS WHICH MAY HAVE TO

BE TAKEN

SECRET

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

DECLASSIFIED

19-02-1
8-5
Copy No(s)
Destroyed by RM/R
Name

FILED

CLASSIFIED FILE

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

-2- SECTO 40, MAY 18, 9 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM PARIS
BE TAKEN AT A LATER TIME, AND

(3) DIRECT THAT ADDITIONAL PLANNING BE UNDERTAKEN.

SOVIET INTENTIONS ARE NOT YET CLEAR. IT IS CONSIDERED UNLIKELY THAT KHRUSHCHEV WILL IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE TAKE ANY ACTION BEYOND PRELIMINARY STEPS LOOKING TOWARD THE EVENTUAL CONCLUSION OF A "SEPARATE PEACE TREATY." HOWEVER, SHOULD THE SOVIETS WITHDRAW, OR APPEAR LIKELY TO WITHDRAW, FROM THEIR ACCESS FUNCTIONS, ALLIED PLANNING CONTEMPLATES THE FOLLOWING MEASURES:

1. PRIOR TO SOVIET ACTION

(A) PREPARATORY MILITARY MEASURES

CERTAIN QUIET, PRECAUTIONARY, AND PREPARATORY MILITARY MEASURES OF A KIND WHICH WOULD NOT CAUSE PUBLIC ALARM BUT WOULD BE DETECTABLE BY SOVIET INTELLIGENCE, WERE TAKEN FOLLOWING THE SOVIET THREAT OF NOVEMBER 1958 TO DEMONSTRATE OUR DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN FREEDOM OF ACCESS. PLANS EXIST FOR ADDITIONAL MEASURES OF THIS SORT, SUCH AS INCREASED ALERT, PREPARATION FOR UNIT DEPLOYMENTS OR DISPERSAL, AND PREPARATION FOR EVACUATION OF SELECTED NON-COMBATANTS IN GERMANY AND BERLIN. THE GOVERNMENTS WILL IN DUE COURSE HAVE TO DECIDE WHICH OF THESE OR OTHER MEASURES OF THIS TYPE WOULD BE TAKEN AND AT WHAT POINTS.

(B) UNITED NATIONS ACTION

IT HAS BEEN AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT, IF SOVIET UNILATERAL ACTION TO WITHDRAW FROM ACCESS FUNCTIONS WERE CLEARLY IMMINENT, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO ATTEMPT TO FORESTALL THIS THROUGH A UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CALLING ON THE FOUR POWERS NOT TO VIOLATE EXISTING AGREEMENTS REGARDING BERLIN, TO NEGOTIATE THEIR DIFFERENCES, AND TO REPORT THE RESULTS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT IS CONSIDERED PREMATURE TO INITIATE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION NOW, BUT AN URGENT DECISION COULD BE REQUIRED AT ANY TIME.

2. AT TIME OF OR AFTER SOVIET ACTION
::: (C) NOTICE TO :::

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

-3- SECTO 40, MAY 18, 9 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM PARIS

(C) NOTICE TO SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC STATEMENT

DRAFTS HAVE BEEN PREPARED FOR NOTES TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND A PUBLIC STATEMENT (WHICH WOULD NOT ONLY EXPLAIN TO WORLD OPINION BUT ALSO PUT THE GDR ON NOTICE) RE-EMPHASIZING SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY UNDER AGREEMENTS CONCERNING BERLIN, EXPLAINING OUR LEGAL INTERPRETATION OF THE SOVIET ACTION, AND SERVING NOTICE AS TO THE PROCEDURES WHICH WE WOULD FOLLOW IN MAINTAINING OUR ACCESS AFTER THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL (AS IN (D) AND (E) BELOW).

(D) SURFACE ACCESS PROCEDURES

AFTER A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, EVERY EFFORT WOULD BE MADE TO CONTINUE NORMAL TRAFFIC, BUT THE THREE POWERS WOULD PUT INTO EFFECT NEW PROCEDURES FOR THE PURPOSE OF IDENTIFYING ALLIED MOVEMENTS AS BEING ENTITLED TO UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO BERLIN. THE PROCEDURES INVOLVE HANDING OVER TO THE EAST GERMAN PERSONNEL AT EACH CHECK-POINT A COPY OF THE ALLIED TRAVEL ORDER, BUT NOT ACCEPTING THE STAMPING OF A TRAVEL ORDER AS A CONDITION OF PASSAGE. PRACTICAL PREPARATIONS FOR INSTITUTING THE NEW PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN COMPLETED.

HERTER

RLC/22

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

5F5JCF

U. S. EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

MESSAGE CENTER

Classification

Control: i 3566

Rec'd: MAY 19. 1960

8:12 AM

35-M

Action -

EUR

Info

SS

G

SP

C

L

И

INR

S3

10

RMR

FROM: PARIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 40. MAY 18. 11 P.M. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 40, REPEATED INFORMATION BOMM 518
LONDON 1087, BERLIN 83, MOSCOW 218, USUN 104.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

(E) AIR ACCESS PROCEDURES

EVERY EFFORT WOULD BE MADE TO MAINTAIN UNRESTRICTED AIR ACCESS AFTER A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM THE BERLIN AIR SAFETY CENTER, AND THE CENTER WOULD CONTINUE TO OPERATE ON A TRIPARTITE BASIS. FOR SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS, ATTEMPTS WOULD BE MADE TO COMMUNICATE FLIGHT INFORMATION DIRECTLY BY RADIO BROADCASTS AND, IF A FEASIBLE METHOD FOR DOING SO IS FOUND, DIRECTLY TO THE EAST GERMAN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AUTHORITIES. EXACT DETAILS REGARDING THE POSSIBLE USE OF TELETYPE OR TELEPHONE FOR THIS PURPOSE REMAIN TO BE WORKED OUT.

931

IF THE FOREGOING MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND THE EAST GERMANS REFUSE TO ACCEPT THE SURFACE ACCESS PROCEDURES MENTIONED OR ATTEMPT TO BLOCK AIR ACCESS, GOVERNMENTAL DECISIONS WILL BE REQUIRED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOLLOWING ASPECTS OF PLANNING WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED ON A STAND-BY BASIS BUT WITHOUT COMMITMENT AS TO THE NECESSITY OR THE TIMING OF THEIR IMPLEMENTATION.

1. MEASURES TO MAINTAIN AIR ACCESS

PERMANENT

SECRET

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

060702Z150

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

-2- SECTO 40, MAY 18, 11 P.M. (SECTION TWO OF TWO), FROM PARIS

(A) PLANS EXIST FOR MAINTAINING CIVIL AIR SERVICES UNDER FLIGHT SAFETY CONDITIONS NOT USUALLY CONSIDERED NORMAL.

(B) PLANS EXIST FOR A "GARRISON AIRLIFT" TO TRANSPORT BY AIR THE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT OF THE ALLIED FORCES WHICH CANNOT MOVE BY SURFACE ROUTES.

(C) PLANS EXIST FOR THE MOVEMENT OF CIVILIAN PASSENGERS BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT WHEN CIVIL AIRLINES ARE NO LONGER PREPARED TO OPERATE.

(D) PLANS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED TO COPE WITH PHYSICAL INTERFERENCE WITH AIR ACCESS.

2. PROBE OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

THERE ARE THREE ALTERNATE PLANS FOR A PROBE ALONG THE AUTOBAHN TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD USE OR PERMIT THE USE OF FORCE TO PREVENT PASSAGE. DECISIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE REGARDING THE TIMING OF THE PROBE AND WHICH OF THE THREE DETAILED PLANS WOULD BE ACCEPTED.

3. MORE ELABORATE MILITARY MEASURES

THE MILITARY COMMANDERS HAVE PLANS FOR MORE ELABORATE MILITARY MEASURES INCLUDING MEASURES WHICH, WHILE THEY MIGHT NOT SUCCEED IN REOPENING ACCESS IN THE FACE OF SOVIET DETERMINATION, COULD NONETHELESS "TAKE THE INITIATIVE REGARDING GROUND ACCESS FROM THE SOVIETS, PROVIDE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS MIGHT PROVE FRUITFUL, AND COMPEL THE SOVIETS TO FACE THE UNMISTAKABLE IMMINENCE OF GENERAL WAR." DECISIONS REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH PLANS, CHOICES OF POSSIBLE COURSES, AND TIMING OF ACTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENTS IN THE LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES AS THEY DEVELOP.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

-3- SECTO 40, MAY 18, 11 P.M. (SECTION TWO OF TWO), FROM PARIS

IV

CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF INDIRECT COUNTERMEASURES, FOR EXAMPLE ECONOMIC MEASURES, MEASURES AGAINST SOVIET AVIATION, AND A NAVAL BLOCKADE IN ORDER TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GDR IN THE EVENT ALLIED ACCESS IS FORCIBLY OBSTRUCTED. IF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT APPROVE, FURTHER CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO THOSE ASPECTS OF PLANNING.

V

THE PLANNING DISCUSSED ABOVE RELATES ONLY TO THE POSSIBILITIES OF INTERFERENCE WITH ALLIED ACCESS. EXTENSIVE STOCKPILES EXIST IN BERLIN AND THERE ARE PLANS FOR A QUADRIPARTITE BERLIN AIRLIFT IN THE EVENT OF A TOTAL SOVIET-GDR BLOCKADE OF LAND ACCESS ROUTES. IT IS CONSIDERED ADVISABLE THAT MORE ATTENTION BE GIVEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF GRADUAL HARASSMENT OF CIVIL (I.E., GERMAN) ACCESS. IF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT APPROVE, PLANNING ABOUT THIS WILL BE INITIATED JOINTLY WITH THE GERMANS. END QUOTE.

HERTER

JNG/20

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED